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POPULISM AND THE RULE OF RECOGNITION: CHALLENGING THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF DEMOCRATIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 
By reference to the impact of populism on the foundational rules of democratic legal systems, the 
paper explores the interconnectedness of two “essentially contested concepts”,1 democracy2 and 
populism,3 and their relationship with another ambiguous concept, the rule of law.4 The main 
argument is that populism aims to amend the democratic rule of recognition, the most important ‘rule 
about rules’ upon which a legal system is founded. This has not been rigorously studied so far, despite 
its significance for a holistic conceptualisation of populism and for the analysis of its relationship with 
democracy. For, the rule of recognition provides a relatively stable point of reference for measuring 
the effect of populism on democracy. 
Based on Hart’s theory of legal positivism,5 the paper argues that while democracy and 
populism purportedly apply similar criteria to determine the validity of laws, populism promotes a 
different hierarchy and understanding of these concepts and, as a result, undermines the foundations 
of democratic legal systems. In particular, by reference to the dominant understandings of populism 
and democracy in political theory and to empirical evidence drawn from current political practice and 
 
1 Gallie, W.B. “Essentially Contested Concepts.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1) (1956), 167–98, 
169. 
2 For the ambiguities of democracy, see Tilly C. Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
For democracy as an essentially contested concept, see Spicer, M.W., “What Do We Mean by Democracy? 
Reflections on an Essentially Contested Concept and Its Relationship to Politics and Public Administration.” 
Administration and Society 51 (5) (2019), 724-748. 
3 Mudde C. 2017. “Populism: An Ideational Approach.” In The Oxford Handbook of Populism eds. C. Rovira 
Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Ochoa Espejo, P. Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 27-47. 
4 Waldron, J., “Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (In Florida)?” Law and Philosophy 21 (2) 
(2002) 137; Krygier, M. “Rule of Law.” In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, eds. M. 
Rosenfeld and A. Sajó, (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 233. 
5 See Hart, HLA, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Carey, S.V. “What is the Rule 
of Recognition in the United States?” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 157 (4) (2009), 1161-1197, 1162. 
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discourse, it will be argued that populism prioritises an absolute sovereignty of a homogeneous 
‘people’ over (a dubious version of) the rule of law as the predominant condition of legal validity, 
while democracy reserves a prominent position for (a thick) rule of law on a par with qualified 
popular sovereignty. By virtue of this reconstruction of the rule of recognition, populism promotes a 
version which resembles authoritarian regimes.  
A secondary premise of the paper is that, contrary to the simplistic view that sees democracy 
as compatible and populism as irreconcilable with the rule of law, it is necessary to elucidate the exact 
version of these concepts in order for valid conclusions to be drawn.6 As discussed in this paper, a key 
distinguishing factor between democracy and populism is that the first can in principle be compatible 
with all versions of the rule of law, whereas populism possibly comports with its most minimal 
version (often described as rule by law) that can accommodate its putative endorsement of absolute 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the rule of law allows populism to claim that it still forms 
part of its rule of recognition. 
The paper begins with a discussion of secondary social rules as the cornerstones of legal 
systems, a fact that makes the populist challenge to the democratic rule of recognition of fundamental 
importance. The next section explains how populism exploits the ambiguity in the nature of social 
rules and introduces a struggle over who is authorised to determine the rule of recognition. At the 
 
6 Lacey, N., “Populism and the Rule of Law.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 15 (2019), 79-96 has 
engaged in a similar, though less ambitious, attempt. Bugaric, B. and Tushnet, M. Populism and 
Constitutionalism: An Essay on Definitions and Their Implications, available 
at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3581660 offer a nuanced analysis of the relationship 
between populism and constitutionalism. Political scientists at times overlook the indeterminate nature of the 
rule of law and argue for its incompatibility with the equally ambiguous concept of populism without further 
elaboration. See, for example, Urbinati, N. “Political Theory of Populism.”Annual Review of Political Science 
22 (2019), 111-27, 112, 121; De la Torre, C. and O. Mazzoleni, “Do We Need a Minimum Definition of 
Populism? An Appraisal of Mudde’s Conceptualization.” Populism 2 (1) (2020), 79-95; Rovira Kaltwasser C., 
“Populism and the question of how to respond to it.” In The Oxford Handbook of Populism 489-507, 625; De la 
Torre, C. ‘Populism in Latin America.’ In The Oxford Handbook of Populism, 267-69. 
3 
 
same time, populists provoke uncertainty about legal validity by instrumentalising the functions of the 
rule, aiming for a reconstruction of its content in accordance with populist premises. To that end, 
populism seeks to reorder and promote a new understanding of the conditions for legal validity, 
placing absolute sovereignty of its ‘pure people’ as the ultimate determinant, while claiming 
compatibility with a thin version of the rule of law. 
 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 
A major contribution of Hart in the philosophy of law was to demonstrate that a legal system is the 
union of primary rules of obligation with secondary rules which determine the validity of the first.7 
These secondary rules about rules are foundational for the legal system and “specify the ways in 
which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact 
of their violation conclusively determined”.8 In sharp contrast to a jurisprudential tradition which 
claimed that law is an act of the sovereign backed by sanctions,9 Hart proved that the rules make the 
sovereign and not the other way around.10 Converting a pre-legal regime based on simple, commonly 
accepted, primary rules of obligation into a legal system, secondary rules remedy the inefficiencies of 
the pre-legal world by addressing the uncertainty about which rules to follow, the static character of 
the rules and the inefficiency of social pressure as a mechanism for their maintenance.11Therefore, 
each legal system is founded on secondary social rules which are backed by social pressure, in the 
form of a rule of recognition, a rule of change and a rule of adjudication.  
 
7 Hart, Concept of Law, 94. 
8 Hart, Concept of Law, 94. 
9 The main exponents of this tradition are Bentham and Austin whose claims were disproved by Hart in the first 
four chapters of the Concept of Law. 
10 Shapiro, S. “What is the Rule of Recognition (And does it exist)?” In The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. 
Constitution, eds. Adler, M. and K. Himma (Oxford University Press, 2009), attributes this formulation to 
Jeremy Waldron. 
11 Hart, Concept of Law, 91-93. 
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In their simplest form, these foundational rules act as the unifying factor of a legal system, 
advancing its cohesion. The rule of recognition addresses the issue of uncertainty by specifying “some 
feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative 
indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts”.12The rule of 
change remedies the static character and slow progress of rules and “empowers an individual or body 
of persons to introduce new primary rules for the conduct of the life of the group, or of some class 
within it, and to eliminate old rules”.13Finally, the rule of adjudication “intended to remedy the 
inefficiency of the pre-law regime’s diffused social pressure, consists of secondary rules empowering 
individuals to make authoritative determinations of the question whether, on a particular occasion, a 
primary rule has been broken”.14 
Either in opposition or in power, populism seeks to harmonise all three secondary rules with 
its main premises though, ultimately, targets the democratic rule of recognition as the most important 
founding rule of the system. For, despite the fact that populists frequently attack the ostensibly corrupt 
legislators for their enactments which serve ‘special interests’ and the ‘out of touch’ judges whose 
decisions classify them as ‘enemies of the people’,15 they do not hesitate, when in power, to retain the 
same rules of change and adjudication if they manage to dominate the existing institutions by 
empowering ‘suitable’ officials to perform these roles.16  
 
12 Hart, Concept of Law, 94.  
13 Hart, Concept of Law, 95. 
14 Hart, Concept of Law, 96. 
15 Judicial independence has been central in discussions about the conflict between populism and 
constitutionalism and, as a result, to the rule of law. Cf. Bugaric / Tushnet, Populism and Constitutionalism, 23-
44 who, due to the relativism of these concepts, argue for a cautious approach. 
16 Muller, What is Populism, 61-62; cf. Blokker, P. “Populism as a Constitutional Project.” International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 17 (2) (2019), 537 n.5. For example, in an unprecedented move, Donald Trump 
succeeded in appointing Amy Coney Barrett to the SCOTUS only a few weeks before the US presidential 
elections; cf. the 2020 Rule of Law report issued by the European Commission, with particular reference to 
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THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE POPULIST CHALLENGES 
Nature of the Rule of Recognition 
According to Hart, the rule of recognition is a social rule17which sets out a ‘regularity of behaviour’18 
or ‘patterns of conduct’19 for a given group. Conforming to such group-wide standards of behaviour, 
the members of the group feel that they are bound to take these standards as guides to their own future 
behaviour and as standard of criticism for deviations from the rule. Although Hart does not explain 
how or why social rules bind the group, their existence is attested by the members’ practical attitude 
of rule-acceptance and their requirements are articulated by the overwhelming behavioural standards 
accepted by the group.  
The rule of recognition is an ultimate rule of the legal system. It does not exist in virtue of any 
other rule; its existence is secured because of its acceptance as a conventional social practice.20 In that 
sense “the general conformity of a group... is part of the reasons which its individual members have 
for acceptance”.21 Therefore, the fact that officials (in particular, judges)22of the system accept and act 
upon the rule of recognition as a standard of conduct proves its existence. For a social rule to exist, a 
 
Hungary and Poland: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-
chapters_en  
17 See Hart, Concept of Law, 109, 255, 292-93. 
18 Endicott, T., “Are There Any Rules?” J Ethics 5 (2001), 199-220; Tucker, A., “Uncertainty in the Rule of 
Recognition and in the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31(1) (2011), 
61-88, 65-66. 
19 Shapiro, S., Legality (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011), 100. 
20 Hart, Concept of Law, 105. 
21 Hart, Concept of Law, 255. 
22 The fact that judges play a prominent role in generating and sustaining the rule of recognition is evident in 
Hart, Concept of Law, 116, 250, 256, 267; cf. Greenawalt, K., “The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution.” 
Mich L Rev 621 (1987), 113-16; Shapiro, S., “On Hart’s Way Out.” Legal Theory 4 (1998), 469-507, 474. 
General conformity by courts, officials and private persons is envisaged in Hart, Concept of Law, 108, 110. 
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majority of the members of the group (i) act according to and intend to conform to the dictates of the 
rule; (ii) criticise others for failing to conform and do not criticise others for criticising; and (iii) 
express their criticism using evaluative language (‘ought’, ‘must’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’). Those members 
of the group accepting the rule by reference to conditions (i) – (iii) are taking, for Hart, the internal 
point of view,23 while members who do not act in accordance with the aforementioned conditions 
(although insiders) have an external point of view.24  
Populism seeks to instrumentalise the ambiguities in the nature of the rule of recognition. 
Acknowledging the indeterminacy in the membership of the relevant social group,25 populists aim 
either to extend the group consisting of judges to include the ‘pure people’26 or, even better, to replace 
the courts as the final determinant of the rule.27 To achieve this, populists engage in a struggle over 
who is legitimated to take the internal point of view.  
 
23 Hart, Concept of Law, 89-90. Cf. Shapiro, S., “What is the Internal Point of View?” Fordham L. Rev. 75 
(2006), 1157; Perry, S., “Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of 
View.’ Fordham L. Rev. 75 (2006) 1171. 
24 Hart, Concept of Law 98. Cf. Shapiro, Internal Point. 
25 See Adler, M.D. “Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. 
Law?” Northwestern University Law Review 100 (2) (2006), 719-805, 720 n.5. 
26 The pure and homogeneous ‘People’ as an essential feature of the populist ontology has long been recognised 
in scholarship. See, for example, Canovan, M., “Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of 
Democracy.” In Democracies and the Populist Challenge, Y. Mény and Y. Surel (New York: Palgrave, 2002) 
25-44, 35; Mudde C. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism. A Very Short Introduction. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2017), 9; Taggart, P. “Populism and 'unpolitics.'” In Populism and the Crisis of Democracy, 
79-87, 79-80.  
27 This could be compatible with the variant of ‘popular constitutionalism’ which suggests that judges and 




For populists, the weak spot of the democratic rule of recognition is that it is primarily 
determined by the practice of courts and only secondarily by its wider acceptance by private 
citizens.28 Decided by judges, the democratic rule of recognition presupposes an independent judiciary 
and its empowerment with the (arguably, super-legislative) power of judicial review. Taking the 
internal point of view, judges assess legal validity based on their accepted rule of recognition. This 
might lead to a judicialisation of political issues, with ‘unelected and unaccountable’ judges 
ostensibly limiting popular sovereignty in the name of, for example, individual rights.  
In well-established constitutional democracies like the United States, where courts are the 
final arbiters of the law,29 judges are criticised of taking unilateral decisions to invalidate legislation 
passed by the elected representatives of the people, purportedly disregarding their will. For example, 
in the case determining the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, late Justice Scalia called attention 
to the Court’s “threat to American democracy” whose decision promoted “a system of government 
that makes the People subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers [which] does not deserve 
 
28 This partly explains the populists’ frequent attacks on the judiciary. See, for example, the record of Poland in 
the recently published 2020 Rule of Law report of the EC, in addition to articles published in the press, e.g. 
https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-threatens-a-budget-veto-over-rule-of-law/. Cf. Bugaric / Tushnet, 
Populism and Constitutionalism, 39-44. For an explanation of this phenomenon from a constitutional 
perspective, see Blokker, Populism as a Constitutional Project, 547-48. 




to be called a democracy”.30 Similar references were made by Donald Trump during the 2016 US 
Presidential election campaign.31 
Even in systems which lack a codified constituting document, such as the United Kingdom, 
the balance between legal powers and legal disabilities of the sovereign body, be it the people or their 
representatives in Parliament, is again determined by courts. In the case of Factortame the court was 
the forum which deliberated on the content of the UK rule of recognition, reordering the criteria by 
giving precedence to EU law over national legislation.32 Similarly in R (Jackson), judges (in obiter) 
questioned the authority of the sovereign UK Parliament to amend the rule of recognition, to whose 
defence the courts would have to come.33 
Populism, advocating an extension of the group whose consensus determines the rule of 
recognition, claims that a ‘correct’ rule of recognition and the corresponding behaviour of judges and 
officials, must conform to the expectations and beliefs of the people and not the other way around. 
Viktor Orban, for example, reacting to a recent court decision ordering the Hungarian government to 
pay compensation for transgressions on school policies, asserted that the decision “is unjust, one 
sided, exaggerated and destructive” as it “violates the sense of justice in Hungarians”. The decision 
 
30 Similar points were made by all dissenting Justices in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). It is 
noteworthy, nevertheless, that Justices of the SCOTUS who recently called for the overruling of Obergefell 
(https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-926_5hdk.pdf ) argue that this is a matter to be fixed by the 
Court. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/05/us/politics/thomas-alito-same-sex-marriage.html.  
31 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/01/31/trump-attacks-supreme-court-decision-
legalizing-same-sex-marriage/ 
32 Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [1990] 2 AC 85 (HL) and R v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603. 
33 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 2; cf. Tucker Uncertainty.  
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should be reached “on the basis of the underlying principle…by asking whether Hungarians can feel 
at home in their own country.”34 
 Populists and the ‘pure people’ can only take the internal point of view. They, rather than the 
judges and other officials, are legitimated to use the ‘correct’ rule of recognition as a standard for 
appraisal and criticism and reject as incompatible or external anything that goes against their version. 
In one of his frequent attacks on the judiciary, Donald Trump claimed that “Judges must not Legislate 
Security and Safety at the Border, or anywhere else...We want the Constitution as written!” since the 
“Obama judges…have a much different point of view than the people who are charged with the safety 
of our country”.35 On 25 April 2017, the White House issued a statement, saying that “the rule of law 
suffered another blow, as an unelected judge unilaterally rewrote immigration policy for our 
Nation.”36These judges, although insiders, cannot have the internal point of view. 
In light of the above, despite being endorsed by the courts under the democratic rule of 
recognition, populists dispute the validity of certain laws which purportedly conflict with their 
‘correct’ version of the rule, and challenge the authority of certain institutions or officials to exercise 
their powers or duties which derive under the ‘incorrect’ version.  
Functions of the Rule of Recognition 
The populist challenge to the democratic rule of recognition extends to an instrumentalization of its 
functions. In that respect, populism: 
i) reviews the rule of recognition as the determinant of the sovereign, by offering its own 
version of who the sovereign is and inserting a form of absolute sovereignty to replace the 
qualified democratic; 
 
34 https://hungarianspectrum.org/2020/05/15/orban-lashes-out-minorities-should-be-put-in-their-place/  




ii) reconsiders the criteria for the conferment of legislative powers, by substituting 
democratic institutionalism which guarantees the periodic and mediated expression of 
popular will with a fixed will of the people which is ostensibly directly discernible by the 
populist leader; 
iii) aims to undermine the certainty provided by the rule, in order to gradually effectuate its 
change. 
I) Making the Sovereign 
Determining the ‘sovereign’ in any legal system is a fundamental function of the rule of recognition.37 
Being a group-wide standard, which provides the official and authoritative way for determining the 
validity of legal rules in the community, the rule of recognition precedes the purported sovereign body 
or person. By delineating the extent of its authority and jurisdiction, the rule makes the sovereign, 
which emerges as a matter of fact, in virtue of its acceptance by the social group. Regardless of 
whether this acceptance is the result of coercion (in the case of a violent regime) or tacit agreement 
(e.g. in the case of a democratically elected parliament), it leads to a regularity of behaviour within the 
group and to the conviction of an obligation to recognise the validity of the rules of the (now) 
sovereign.38  
The sovereignty of the people allegedly is the cornerstone of both populism and democracy 
and forms part of their rule of recognition as a core determinant of legitimacy; yet the different 
understandings of this concept allow populism to promote its own version.39 The ambiguity of popular 
sovereignty partly lies in the fact that it requires a certain ‘people’ to be based. This ‘people’, in 
 
37 See Hart, Concept of Law; cf. Dworkin, R. Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986). 
38 Hart, Concept of Law, 203, 257. 
39 See, for example, Mudde / Kaltwasser, Populism, 80; Mudde, C. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser, “Studying 
Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research 
Agenda.” Comparative Political Studies 51 (13) (2018), 1667-93, 1670. 
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addition to being the ‘constituent power’40 (the original author and legitimating basis of the 
constitutional order),41 is also envisaged as the ever-present and abstract collective agent who has the 
“power to model the state”.42 Yet, the idea of an abstract ‘people’ has been seen as a foundational 
myth according legitimacy to the regime43 since, consisting of individuals, this ‘people’ can be neither 
static nor homogeneous.44  
Secondly, the notion of sovereignty is far from unambiguous.45 If sovereignty is interpreted as 
absolute power wielded by the people, then democracy’s qualified version is unappealing and the 
promise of populism for an ostensibly absolute sovereignty appears attractive. Alternatively, if 
sovereignty means that the polity is constituted by and power emanates from the people, then the 
locus of constituted power must be left unoccupied and the people need to enter into a fiduciary 
relationship with trustees who exercise power on their behalf. Nevertheless, this deviates from the 
original idea of sovereignty as the ‘absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth’46and needs to 
be revisited.  
 
40 Kalyvas, A. “Popular Sovereignty, the Constituent Power, and Democracy,” Constellations 12 (2) (2005). 
41 Waldron, J. Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 255. 
42 Lawson, G. Political Sacra et Civilis, ed. Conal Condren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 47; 
Locke, J. The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil 
Government, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 366–7. 
43 Kelsen, H. Pure Theory of Law trans. M. Knight (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1989), 204, 256. 
44 For the problem of who are the people in democracy, see Ochoa Espejo, P. “Populism and the Idea of the 
People.” In The Oxford Handbook of Populism. 
45 On the history of popular sovereignty see Bourke, R. and Q. Skinner, eds. Popular Sovereignty in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
46 Bodin, J. On Sovereignty, Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth, ed. and trans. J. Franklin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1. 
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Democracy is a system which “welcomes and preserves indeterminacy”47and is better seen as 
a dynamic and open-ended process (democratization).48It is in this context that the democratic version 
of both the people and sovereignty must be examined. Promoting equal and universal suffrage, 
democracy’s aspiration is to encourage inclusivity and expand the public space to include the entire 
population.49 The power of all as the foundational democratic ideal is simultaneously the power of 
anyone (i.e. of every individual who has the right to have its rights protected and the means to make 
good on them) and the power of nobody (which emphasizes the principle of impartiality and shelters 
the locus of power from appropriation).50 
Democratic popular sovereignty is qualified. This stems from the symbolic representation of 
sovereignty as an empty ‘locus of power’ that was vacated after the mutation of the incarnated and 
absolute sovereignty of the monarch of the Ancien Regime into a disembodied and qualified 
sovereignty of the abstract people. While the pre-modern notion assumed the symbolic condensation 
of power, law and knowledge in the body of the prince, the birth of democracy required the 
dissolution of these features.51 An attempt to see democratic popular sovereignty as the re-unification 
of power, law and knowledge, incarnated into a homogeneous ‘people’ occupying the locus of power, 
could lead to the degeneration of democracy into a ‘tyranny of the majority’.52Therefore, far from 
being absolute, the democratic sovereignty envisaged by the rule of recognition is checked by, inter 
alia, constitutional law, judicial review, international law and human rights.53  
 
47 Lefort, C. Democracy and Political Theory, trans. D. Masey (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988), 16. 
48 Dahl, R., Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).  
49 Whitehead, L. Democratization. Theory and Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
50 Rosanvallon, P. “Populism and Democracy in the 21st Century.” In Rethinking Open Society eds. M. Ignatieff, 
and S. Roch, (Central European University Press: 2018) 227-242, 237-39. 
51 See Lefort, Democracy, 16-18. 
52 de Tocqueville, A. Democracy in America. (New York: Vintage Books, 1954). 
53 The compatibility of (popular) ‘sovereignty’ with law is disputed. See Eleftheriadis, P., “Law and 
Sovereignty.” Law and Philosophy 29 (2010), 535-569. 
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Populism, conversely, as a phenomenon which depicts society divided between the “pure 
people versus the corrupt elite, but also claims that politics is about respecting popular sovereignty at 
any cost”,54 promises absolute sovereignty to its ‘people’. This ‘people’ is a static and homogeneous 
singular collectivity with continuous existence over time, capable of action, of having common 
interests and a fixed general will.55 This is an artificial construction, at best referring to a specific 
interpretation (and simplification) of reality.56  
The populist cosmology reserves for its ‘people’ the occupation of the locus of power and the 
embodiment of sovereignty as in “one supernatural body driven by one superhuman, irresistible 
general will”.57 The ‘people’ is envisaged as the incarnation of sovereignty in a pre-modern, 
authoritarian sense (condensing power, law, and knowledge)58 and as the ultimate measure of political 
justice and legitimacy.59 By virtue of its fiction of the People-as-One claiming unlimited and perpetual 
sovereignty, populism is in a liminal state between democracy and totalitarianism.60  
In light of the above, the populist rule of recognition, promoting absolute sovereignty for its 
‘people’,  suggests that law is subordinate to popular will and is valid when it protects and perpetuates 
its reign.61 Both as a sovereign-in-command and as the constituent power of the polity, the populist 
 
54 Mudde / Kaltwasser, Studying Populism 1669. 
55 Canovan, Taking Politics 35. 
56 Mudde / Kaltwasser, Populism 9. 
57 Arendt, H., On Revolution, (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), 60. 
58 “The moment the people is legitimately assembled as a sovereign body, the jurisdiction of the government 
wholly lapses, the executive power is suspended, and the person of the meanest citizen is as sacred and 
inviolable as that of the first magistrate; for in the presence of the person represented, representatives no longer 
exist” Rousseau, J.J. The Social Contract, trans. G. Cole (London: Everyman, 1973), 264. 
59 Urbinati, Political theory 113. 
60 Cf. Blokker, Populism as a Constitutional Project, 536. 
61 As Krygier suggests, “when I look at what bad guys in power do, today, in Poland, Hungary, Turkey, for 
example, I find they often take the law pretty seriously. They like to use it but they don’t want it to get in their 
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‘people’ have the absolute authority to legitimate the higher norms of the constitution. In that sense, 
populism appears to insert a primitive view of absolute sovereignty in its rule of recognition and – 
inaccurately – suggests that it is the ‘sovereign’ that creates the rules, instead of the rules making the 
sovereign.62 
This is best illustrated by the reactions to the decision63 of the UK Supreme Court following 
the Brexit referendum, that the UK Government does not have the legal power to initiate withdrawal 
from the European Union without the authorisation of an Act of Parliament. As the court declared, 
where “implementation of a referendum result requires a change in the law… [this] must be made in 
the only way in which the UK constitution permits, namely through Parliamentary legislation” 
(para.121). Prominent constitutional lawyers observed that “many people have found the decision 
surprising” although the reasoning “rests on a clear line of case-law going back four hundred years 
and turns on a foundational principle of constitutional law”.64 This surprise is best understood by 
reference to the insertion of ‘absolute sovereignty of the pure people’ in the populist version of the 
rule of recognition. The vitriolic commentaries in part of the press against the decision and the judges 
aimed to convince the public that neither parliament and the constitution are supreme, nor could they 
restrain the absolute sovereignty of the ‘pure people’.65The latter, limited to the 51.9% who voted for 
 
way, and they devote energies to making sure it is apt for what they want, and not what they do not”. Krygier, 
M. “Why the rule of law matters.” Jurisprudence 9 (1) (2018), 146-158, 152. 
62 Cf. Beckman, L. “Popular Sovereignty Facing the Deep State.” Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy (2019). 
63 Miller & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Rev 3) [2017] 
UKSC 5 (24 January 2017). 
64 Barber N. and J. King, ‘Responding to Miller’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (7th November 2016) (available 
at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/) also commented that “The only remarkable thing about the judgment is how 
such quality was produced under such extraordinary time and political pressure”. 
65 The Daily Mail (4 November 2016) ran the headline ‘Enemies of the People’, underneath pictures of the 
judges; ‘The judges vs. the people’ was the front headline of The Daily Telegraph, whilst The Daily 
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Brexit,66 being the absolute sovereign, should be able to override any obstacles posed by judges even 
when they apply the constitutional principles of the system.67 
II) Conferring Legislative Powers 
The rule of recognition confers powers on persons qualified in certain ways to legislate by complying 
with certain procedural and/or substantive criteria.68Both democracy and populism ostensibly accept 
that these powers should be exercised in accordance with their respective versions of popular 
sovereignty. Hence, the legitimacy of the power to legislate arguably depends on its conformity to the 
will of the people. To achieve this, while democracy mainly focuses on the quality of the institutional 
and procedural setting which guarantees that the will of the people is discerned,69 populism prioritises 
 
Express enjoined its readers to rise up and ‘fight, fight, fight’. An editorial published in the last newspaper, 
entitled  “After judges' Brexit block now your country really needs you: We MUST get out of the EU”, 
described the judgment as a decision by the “the highest legal minds in the land […] to hand back to that 
Westminster cabal the very power the people believe they should not be trusted with”. For the Brexit coverage 
in The Daily Mail see Breeze, R. “‘Enemies of the people’: Populist performances in the Daily Mail reporting of 
the Article 50 case.” Discourse Context Media (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcm.2018.03.008  
66 As Freeden, M. “After the Brexit referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology.” Journal of Political 
Ideologies, 22 (1) (2017), 1-11, 7 notes: “Brexiters, too, invoke the referendum as the ‘will of the people’, a 
phrase understood as a singular homogeneous monolith, conveniently ignoring that 62.5% of the electorate 
(‘remainers’, and those who abstained from participating) did not vote to leave the EU but are ‘automatically’ 
included in that will.” For the fact that referendums can oversimplify complex policy options, with particular 
reference to Brexit, see Bugaric / Tushnet, Populism and Constitutionalism, 46-55 and 74-87. 
67 Sajid Javid, then Communities Secretary, declared that the High Court case was ‘an attempt to frustrate the 
will of the British people and it is unacceptable.’ Question Time, BBC 1, 3 November 2016, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b081wrzp/question-time-03112016  
68 Hart, Concept of Law, 70, 77. 
69 Habermas, J. Between Facts and Norms, trans. by W. Rehg (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 450: “The 
democratic legitimation of law is not exhausted by the authentic expression of a people’s will but presupposes 
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the compatibility of these laws with an artificial, fixed popular will as interpreted by the populist 
leader.  
Democracy envisages majority rule as the method for popular will to be expressed. Yet, 
majority rule often represents a coincidental majority which, depending on the populace’s inclusion 
and participation in the decision-making processes, might be narrow.70 To redress this, a viable 
democracy relies on the creation of an efficacious public space.71The democratic condition of 
(mediated) compatibility between law and the will of the (indeterminate) sovereign people requires 
knowledge of the latter. That knowledge, not being reserved as anyone’s prerogative, is discernible as 
the periodic outcome of an open debate taking place in the public space. For this to be meaningful, the 
endorsement of pluralism, inclusivity and public contestation in a system of political competition 
which implies the possibility to oppose the government and to offer alternative points of view, is 
essential.72 Democracy is “a regime founded upon the legitimacy of a debate as to what is legitimate 
and what is illegitimate”73 - a debate which, since the locus of power remains empty and no one can 
take the place of the supreme judge, is necessarily indefinite.  
Populism, on the other hand, stretches the democratic rules towards extreme majoritarianism; 
pluralism is curtailed and the infallibility of an ostensibly fixed will of the people, purportedly 
discerned by the populist leader, allows little room for public contestation.74Populism’s Manichaeistic 
approach to politics, which envisages that a corrupt collectivity75 (Elite, Establishment, ‘out-group’) 
 
and privileges the procedural conditions of democratic opinion-and-will-formation as the sole course of 
legitimation”. 
70 Rosanvallon Populism and Democracy, 230. 
71 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 486.  
72 Rovira Kaltwasser, C., “The ambivalence of Populism: Threat and Corrective for Democracy”, 
Democratization 19 (2) (2012), 184-208, 196. 
73 Lefort, Democracy, 39. 
74 See Urbinati, N. “Populism and the Principle of Majority.” In The Oxford Handbook of Populism. 
75 Mudde / Kaltwasser, Populism 16; cf. Mudde, Ideational approach, 4. 
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restricts or negates the sovereignty of the ‘people’ and ostensibly engages in a domineering attitude 
over them,76accepts no dissent, especially from the establishment that occupies the present 
institutions. Populism does not score high in terms of inclusiveness either; despite being only one part 
of the population, its ‘people’ symbolically appropriates the whole and claims for itself absolute and 
exclusive legitimacy.77 
Populism bases itself on a conception of incarnation as the best form of representation in 
which both the ‘pure people’ incarnate the sovereign and the leader is their embodiment.78 Ostensibly 
being in a privileged position to know their true will,79 the populist leader is the voice of the ‘people’ 
(vox populi) and offers the supremely authoritative correct interpretation of the common good, to the 
exclusion of other institutions, notably constitutional courts and independent authorities.80 It is this 
‘authentic’ will of the people, rather than a distorted version suggested by the institutional setting 
designed by the elite, which ought to be inserted in the rule of recognition as the ultimate source of 
legislative powers. 
Panos Kammenos, for example, leader of the ‘Independent Greeks’ (AN.EL.), the far-right 
junior coalition partner in both Syriza governments between 2015-2019, while in opposition, 
frequently called the Greek people to drive out the “foreign occupation forces” and “democratically 
lynch” their local representatives, such as the former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, despite being 
democratically elected. Applying his own rule of recognition, he repeatedly urged the ‘honest’ judges 
 
76 Urbinati, Political Theory, 119. 
77 Urbinati, Political Theory, 120; Espejo, Idea of the People, 783-84. 
78 Rosanvallon, Populism and Democracy, 234. 
79 Bugaric / Tushnet, Populism and Constitutionalism, 14-15 identify ‘reliable determination’ of the majority’s 
preferences as a key concept of populism. 
80 Müller, J.-W. What is populism? (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 25-33. 
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to strike down the laws which ostensibly violated the true will of the people.81 Unsurprisingly, such 
allegations had already been scrutinised and rejected by the courts which defended the democratic 
version of the rule. 
III) Preventing Uncertainty 
The rule of recognition provides the characteristics the possession of which renders a rule (or a legal 
principle)82 legally binding in a given system.83 In that respect, the rule of recognition, as a widely 
accepted social rule, aims to remove uncertainty and contributes to the justification of the coercion of 
law by excluding one moral objection to it.84  
Populism manipulates this function and challenges the democratic version of the rule by 
reintroducing moral objections to justify disobedience.85 Using aggressive rhetoric, populists fiercely 
criticise the acts of political elites (and unelected judges), questioning the legitimacy of their decisions 
in moral terms.86 For instance, Alexis Tsipras, not recognising the validity of laws passed under the 
 
81 https://www.tanea.gr/2014/09/10/politics/kammenos-o-laos-tha-lintsarei-dimokratika-ti-simerini-kybernisi; 




82 Hart, Concept of Law, 259-60. 
83 Hart, Concept of Law, 100, 103. 
84 Hart, Concept of Law, 250. 
85 The distinction between the pure People and the corrupt ‘out-group’ is predominantly moral, not situational. 
Mudde / Kaltwasser, Populism, 16. 
86 See Mudde / Kaltwasser, Studying Populism, 1669. 
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Economic Adjustment Programmes, called the Greek people to abstain from making any payments 
under the unjust and immoral regime imposed by the creditors and their local minions.87 
In order to prevent uncertainty in the system, the rule of recognition imposes a duty on 
officials to apply the valid rules.88 Being used as the standard for the appraisal of their own and 
others’ behaviour,89the rule governs general conduct because it guides the behaviour of a system’s 
courts and, as a result, of its citizens.90 However, Hart acknowledges the possibility of partial 
disagreement and lack of uniform official consensus.91 When there is a division within the official 
world (or a division among the judiciary)92 or when the official sector becomes detached from the 
private sector, in the sense that there is no longer general obedience to the rules which are valid 
according to the rule of recognition,93it is likely that the latter has shifted.94  
Since the rule of recognition is determined as an empirical question of fact, widespread 
distrust of official decisions and general disobedience, may trigger partial disagreement within the 






88 Hart, Concept of Law, 258. 
89 Hart, Concept of Law, 98. 
90 Greenawalt, Rule of Recognition, 113-16. 
91 Hart, Concept of Law, 123. 
92 Hart, Concept of Law, 122. 
93 Hart, Concept of Law, 118. 
94 Hart, Concept of Law, 120. 
20 
 
such an uncertainty in the rule of recognition within the official sector.95 Bolstering detachment 
between the official and the social spheres, populists often aggravate it to the extent of disruption.96 
The social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate or threaten to deviate from the 
rule is the primary factor for it giving rise to obligations.97Deliberately or instinctively exploiting the 
dependency of the rule on social acceptance and pressure, populists, in addition to the sphere of 
officials, seek to undermine consensus on the level of society. The challenge consists in adjusting and 
redirecting the social pressure behind its enforcement in accordance with the populist interests.98 The 
populist narrative of ostensibly anti-popular enactments of corrupt elites might be used as a 
justification for lack of obedience and, thus, decrease the social pressure within society which 
contributes to law-abidingness. Their next step is for the social pressure to be forcefully redirected 
towards the officials and the political establishment.99 If the populist version is verified by the popular 
vote, then it is likely that the official and judicial sectors will follow and a shift to the rule of 
recognition will be a fact, either through a formal constitutional amendment or an infusion of a new 
 
95 See, for example, Donald Trump’s attacks on the judiciary: https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/research-reports/his-own-words-presidents-attacks-courts. 
96 Tsipras, for example, referred to the duty of Greek people under Art. 120(4) of the Constitution to resist by all 
means against its violent abolition by the elites: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBvvUt44C04. 
97 Hart, Concept of Law, 86-87. 
98 For such activities by Syriza see Katsambekis G., ‘Radical Left Populism in Contemporary Greece: Syriza’s 
Trajectory from Minority Opposition to Power.’ Constellations 23 (3) (2016), 391-403. 
99 In the early years of the Greek crisis, attacks against state officials were common: 
https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2011/03/17/greeks-hurl-yogurt-at-deputy-prime-minister-video/; 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/8203980/Former-Greek-minister-attacked-by-mob-
as-riots-break-out-in-Greece.html). Court decisions were attacked by anti-austerity parties and were questioned 






legal culture100 or ethos to the constitution.101The populist attempt to alter the democratic rule of 
recognition and, as a result, make its ‘people’ sovereign, will succeed. 
Content of the Rule of Recognition 
The rule of recognition is a living rule whose content is indeterminate and evolving.102 The rule might 
provide both positive criteria for the identification of the law in the form of certain characteristics that 
a rule must have, and disabilities in the form of constrains to the powers of those qualified to 
legislate.103 Where there is conflict between those criteria, provision may be made for their 
arrangement in an order of relative subordination and primacy.104 Changes in the content of this social 
rule might be deliberate, when the practice of legal officials shifts due to a constitutional 
 
100 Blokker, Populism as a Constitutional Project, 548. 
101 Tsiftsoglou, A. “Greece after the memoranda: a constitutional retrospective.” GreeSE papers (132). The 
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100400/1/GreeSE_No132.pdf 
102 Hart, Concept of Law, 109, 148, 251; cf. Tucker, Uncertainty; Raz, J. “On the Authority and Interpretation of 
Constitutions: Some Preliminaries.” In Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, ed. L. Alexander, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Cf. Hubbard, P. “Power to the People: The Takings Clause, 
Hart’s Rule of Recognition, and Populist Law-Making.” University of Louisville Law Review 50 (2011) 87, 125: 
“the rule of recognition cannot be stated in full…it is not necessary to state all the rule in order to apply it in a 
practical sense and to use it in a theoretical sense to develop the important underlying concept of a single unified 
rule for determining validity”. 
103 Hart, Concept of Law, 70. 
104 Hart, Concept of Law, 95, 101. 
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amendment105 or to a landmark judicial decision106 or they may be triggered by political turmoil (such 
as a revolution or a foreign occupation).107 
The general characteristics according validity to a primary rule vary. These might concern 
both the manner in which laws are adopted or created by legal institutions and their substance 
(principles of justice or substantive moral values may be necessary characteristics and take the form 
of constraints to law-making).108 In a simple system, the fact that a rule has been enacted by a specific 
body might be enough to accord legal validity to it,109 whilst in more complex systems these criteria 
might include, inter alia, references to an authoritative text; to legislative enactment; to customary 
practice; to past judicial decisions or even to issues of substantive or political morality.110  
I) Democratic v populist rule 
The democratic rule of recognition aims to harmonise the actions of officials and to unify the legal 
system by reference to a widely accepted, democratic shared plan which provides for the main goals 
and values that the system should pursue and realise.111 Its precise content varies between 
jurisdictions, but the overarching conditions of legal validity would include a properly elected 
legislature whose enactments are recognised as valid law in virtue of acting as the representative of 
the electorate;112an authoritative text which provides for procedural and, possibly, substantive 
 
105 Edlin, D. “The Rule of Recognition and the Rule of Law.” The American Journal of Comparative Law 64 (2) 
(2016) 371. 
106 See Tucker, Uncertainty. 
107 Hart, Concept of Law, 118. 
108 Hart, Concept of Law, 247, 248, 250, 269. 
109 Hart, Concept of Law, 95. 
110 Hart, Concept of Law, 100. 
111 Shapiro, Rule of Recognition. 
112 Hart, Concept of Law, 102, 107 envisages that the phrase ‘What the Queen in Parliament enacts is law’ is the 
UK rule of recognition. 
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conditions and also specifies the order of precedence of the rules;113and principles such as respect for 
the rule of law, international obligations and the protection of fundamental human rights.114 The rule 
of law, in particular, is of paramount importance and is on a par with a qualified version of popular 
sovereignty as the ultimate criteria of legal validity in the democratic rule of recognition.115 This is 
evident in the rule of recognition of the United States where the Constitution, being its main exponent, 
provides for the validity and hierarchy of rules by reference to both qualified democratic institutions 
and procedures and to substantive constrains, posed by a Bill of Rights and determined by the 
courts.116 
Populism aims to amend the democratic rule of recognition and replace it with a version that 
purportedly reflects a return to ‘real’ democracy. By placing popular sovereignty and the general will 
of the people as the supreme criteria of validity, populism alters the order of precedence and 
subordination of the rules of the system. This reordering is paramount for the attractiveness of 
populism; while it appears corrective of democracy, it fundamentally alters the rule of recognition on 
which the whole system is founded. This change would provide for decisions in popular referenda to 
 
113 Shapiro, Rule of Recognition, 84. 
114 See Bingham, T. The Rule of Law. (London: Penguin, 2011). 
115 The rule of law has been beautifully described as “one star in a constellation of ideals” by Waldron, J. “Rule 
By Law: A much Maligned Proposition.” In NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 19-19, 
available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3378167  
116 For example, Marbury v. Madison inserted judicial review in the rule of recognition which was subsequently 
accepted by officials and citizens. Cf. Carey, What is the Rule of Recognition. 
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override parliaments117 and ‘national consultations’ to inform the decisions of the judiciary.118 In 
virtue of this reordering of the criteria for validity, rules conflicting with the will of the people (and 
their standards of morality as discerned by populists) 119should be set aside, even if these reflect a 
commitment to the rule of law or provide for the protection of fundamental human rights.  
In addition to the reordering of the criteria, the populist reconstruction of the democratic rule 
of recognition involves a revision of the meaning of fundamental concepts. While promoting a 
different understanding of popular sovereignty as discussed above, populism claims compatibility 
 
117 In addition to the British referendum on the EU, one can indicatively refer to the statement by Zoe 
Konstantopoulou, then President of the Hellenic Parliament, on the night of the announcement of the Greek 
referendum in July 2015, who reified the will of the people as the constituent power in contradistinction to 
“those who seek to abolish the constitution and the democracy through blackmail and force”. 
(https://www.tanea.gr/2015/06/27/politics/epiklisi-toy-114-ekane-i-zwi-kwnstantopoyloy-eksw-apo-to-
maksimoy/ 
118  ‘National consultations’ are organised by the Hungarian government, in the form of e.g. a survey of citizens’ 
views on the issue of segregation of schoolchildren, in response to a recent court decision. Following a similar 
‘national consultation’ the “Stop Soros” laws survived domestic judicial review, despite their alleged violation 
of EU law and fundamental human rights. (https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2020).) 
However, ‘national consultations’ per se could – under certain circumstances – be considered as “creative 
populist institutions consistent with constitutionalism”, as described by Bugaric / Tushnet, Populism and 
Constitutionalism, 60. 





with the rule of law provided that the meaning of this concept is modified.120For the soundness of this 
statement to be examined, an analysis of the various versions of this ambiguous concept is necessary. 
II) Democracy, Populism and (which) Rule of Law 
The rule of law theory is divided between teleological and anatomical approaches.121 The first 
suggests that the rule of law is a means to an end, so the objectives that it aspires to serve must be 
clearly stated (and scrutinised) at the outset122 in order to evaluate its effectiveness and merit.123For 
example, regardless of its substance, if its main objective is to protect individuals against the potential 
of arbitrary exercise of power,124 then the rule of law is incompatible with absolute sovereignty.125 
Similarly, if law is instrumentalised to attain the perpetuation of popular sovereignty, there is hardly 
anything that prevents the ‘rule by law’ to be rephrased into a ‘rule of law’ for those who see this as a 
valid objective and understand the term in minimal, purely formalistic, terms.126 
 
120 Shortly after the publication of the 2020 Rule of Law report by the Commission, Hungary and Poland 
announced the set-up of their own rule of law institute. https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-and-hungary-
charge-brussels-with-double-standards-on-rule-of-law/  
121 For a concise exploration of ‘anatomical’ and ‘teleological’ theories of rule of law, see Krygier, Rule of Law. 
122 Krygier, M. “The Potential for Resilience of Institutions to Sustain the Rule of Law”, Hague Journal on the 
Rule of Law 12 (2020), 205–213, 206. 
123 Ginsburg, T. “Difficulties with Measuring the Rule of Law.” In Handbook on the Rule of Law, 48-56. 
124 Krygier, M. “Tempering Power.” In Constitutionalism and Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and Realism eds. 
Adams, M., E. Ballin and A. Meuwse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 34–59; Krygier M. and 
A. Winchester, “Arbitrary Power and the ideal of the rule of law.” In Handbook on the Rule of Law, 75-95. 
125 Tamanaha, B.Z. On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 92. 
126 Peerenboom, R., “Varieties of rule of law: An introduction and provisional conclusion.” In Asian Discourses 
of Rule of Law, ed. R. Peerenboom (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004); Cf. Krygier, Why the Rule of Law 
Matters, 152; Fuller, L., “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart.” Harvard Law Review 71 




On the other hand, most legal theorists follow an anatomical approach.127  Determining its typology 
by reference to content, ‘formal’ versions of the rule of law are often contrasted to ‘thick’ or 
‘substantive’. Formal theories focus on the proper sources of and procedures for legality whilst the 
Substantive include requirements about the content of the law (usually that it must comport with 
justice or moral principles).128 
It has been suggested129 that the thinnest Formal version is ‘Rule by Law’ in which all 
utterances of the sovereign, because they are utterances of the sovereign, are law and all government 
action is authorised by law. However, understood in this way, the rule of law has no real meaning as it 
collapses into the notion of rule by the government, a feature that every modern state has.130 In this 
narrow sense, the law exists not to limit the state but to serve its power.  
The second version, ‘Formal Legality’ is dominant among legal theorists.131 This requires the 
presence of formal criteria (e.g. generality, clarity, public promulgation, stability over time, non-
 
127 Krygier, Why the rule of law matters, 147-48. 
128  Tamanaha, Rule of Law, 92. Substantive versions are dominant in the continental legal theory and have 
influential adherents in the Anglo-Saxon world (e.g. Bingham, Rule of Law); for the German approach: Pierot, 
B., “Historische Etappen des Rechtsstaats in Deutschland.” Jura 10 (2011); for France: Heuschling, L. ‘Etat de 
droit.’ In L’influence du droit européen sur les catégories juridiques du droit publique ed. Auby, J.B.  (Dalloz, 
2010), 549. 
129 See, for example, Neumann, F. “The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society.” In The Rule of Law 
Under Siege ed. Scheuerman, W. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1996), 104; This view was discredited by 
Raz, J. Authority of Law 212–13; Waldron, J. “Rule by Law: A much Maligned Preposition.” NYU School of 
Law, Public Law Research Paper No.19 (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3378167) 
presents the complexities of the distinction between rule of law and rule by law and offers a nuanced analysis of 
whether the denigration of rule by law is warranted or desirable. 
130 Tamanaha, Rule of Law 92; cf. Krygier, Rule of Law, 234. 
131 E.g. Tamanaha, Rule of Law; disputed by Bedner, A. “The Promise of a Thick View.” In Handbook on the 
Rule of Law 34-47.  
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retroactivity)132 promoting the certainty and predictability of rules as opposed to ad hoc orders.133 
Having no content requirements and saying nothing about how the law is to be made, by tyrants or 
democratic majorities, this thin account of the rule of law is susceptible to abuse.134 
The thickest formal version is concerned with how the content of law will be determined135 
and adds ‘Democracy’ to ‘Formal Legality’. These are mutually constitutive for without formal 
legality, democracy can be circumvented (because government officials can undercut the law) and 
without democracy formal legality loses its legitimacy.136 Nevertheless, these democratic participatory 
mechanisms do not guarantee expedient and benevolent but only legitimate laws, by allowing an 
equal opportunity to participate and securing everyone’s consent. 
The Substantive version of the rule of law is an amalgam of democracy, formal legality and 
individual rights.137 In that version, individual rights do not merely form the content of positive law, 
but they are the wider background and integral aspect of its fabric.138  This version reserves a central 
place for an independent judiciary. As the meaning and reach of moral and political principles are 
 
132 Raz J. The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 211; 
Møller, J. “The Advantages of a Thin View.” In Handbook on the Rule of Law 21-33. 
133 Rijpkema, P. “The rule of law beyond thick and thin.” Law and Philosophy 32(6) (2013), 813. 
134 Raz, J., ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ Law Quarterly Review 93 (1977) 197, 214; Raz, Authority of Law, 
211; Fuller, Morality of Law, 153; Summers, R.S. “A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law.” Ratio Juris 6 (2) 
(2007), 127 – 142, 136. 
135Habermas, Between Facts 449, 189; Tamanaha, Rule of Law, 99 
136 Tamanaha, Rule of Law, 99-100. 
137 Allan, T.R.S. Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 21–22; However, many rule of law definitions do include human rights but exclude the 
procedural element of democracy.  




often unclear and go beyond the ‘rule book’ applied by judges, the latter are authorised to resolve 
controversies (by reference to the values of the community).139 
The aspiration of democracy is to be compatible with all versions of the rule of law. Provided 
that the system comports with the procedural requirements envisaged by formal legality, implement 
sophisticated and rigorous accountability processes and have a system of separation of powers and 
checks and balances which allows for an independent judiciary, democracy and the rule of law are 
‘mutually constitutive’.140 Democratic law is binding not as an ‘utterance of the sovereign’ but as the 
product of public space. To prevent arbitrary rule, the will of the people is checked both by reference 
to individual rights and by shifting from a vote-based to a consent-based legitimation of decisions.141 
The commitment of (liberal) democracy to individual liberty makes its potential to attain the thickest 
versions of the rule of law realistic.142 
Populism in power, conversely, as extreme majoritarianism, is possibly the ‘rule by law’ 
system par excellence.143 Its laws are legitimated as ostensibly grounded on popular sovereignty and 
majority rule. Populists, manipulating the (thinnest version of the) rule of law, are then free to rule by 
law, for the laws of the system are utterances of the ‘sovereign people’, especially when these are 
direct expressions of their will as, for example, in referendums.144 In that respect, not only government 
 
139 Dworkin, Political Judges, 268. 
140 Habermas, J., “On the Internal Relation between the rule of law and democracy.” European Journal of 
Philosophy 3 (1) (1995), 12-20. 
141 Tamanaha, Rule of Law, 100. 
142 Hutchinson, A. and P. Monahan, “Democracy and the Rule of Law.” In The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology, 
eds. Hutchinson A. and P. Monahan (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), 100. 
143 Waldron, Rule by Law, 14-17 described the ways in which rule by law deserves to be called as such (e.g. the 
rulers accept the formal discipline of legality, observe due process, choose to govern by law that is properly 
publicised, not retrospective or unduly vague rather than by arbitrary decrees, accept to be constrained by formal 
and procedural requirements) and, as a result, narrows the gap with the formal versions of the rule of law. 
144 Cf. Bugaric / Tushnet, Populism and Constitutionalism, 44-60. 
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action will be authorised by law but obedience to the (populist) law is essential for the perpetuation of 
popular sovereignty.  
In principle, populism might be compatible with most criteria of Formal Legality but in 
practice it appears to fall short of attaining the prevention of arbitrariness, which is the fundamental 
aim of the rule of law. In populist systems, the objective of legal certainty might become unattainable 
due to ambiguous laws, frequent constitutional interventions, and rapid and unpredictable shifts of 
popular opinion.145 Alternatively, if the populist leader interprets and enacts the general will of the 
homogeneous people as fixed and petrified, legal certainty might be attained, however detrimental to 
the out-groups.  
The putative aspiration of populism is the attainment of the “Democracy + Formal Legality” 
version of the rule of law, notwithstanding the caveats concerning the compatibility of popular 
sovereignty with legal certainty and an independent judiciary. Regarding the ‘Democracy’ 
component, populism promises a return to its purest form in which sovereignty is absolute and politics 
is an expression of the general will of the people. However, as already discussed, problems arise with 
populism’s curtailment of pluralism, public contestation and inclusivity. Despite its pledge for a 
revival of real democracy, populism’s anti-pluralist ontology and antagonistic cosmology are 
incompatible with the ‘Democracy’ and the Substantive elements of the rule of law.146 Unless there is 
a strong communal belief in natural or divine law, any legal enactment of rights would be selective, 
fragile, tendentious and vulnerable to shifts in popular opinion.  
To conclude, the relationship of democracy and populism with the rule of law depends on two 
variables: the purpose that the rule of law is envisaged to serve, and the version applied. Democracy 
often prioritises its liberal aspect which subordinates popular sovereignty to individual rights and, 
thus, aspires to attain a thick, substantive rule of law as the ultimate criterion of legal validity. 
Populism, on the other hand, gives precedence to an absolute popular sovereignty and opts to 
 
145 Blokker, Populism as a Constitutional Project, 546. 
146 This has raised a concern over subjecting questions about individual rights to referendums. See Bugaric / 
Tushnet, Populism and Constitutionalism, 55 with n. 94. 
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instrumentalise a thin, formal version of the rule of law to serve that end. While the rule by law might 
still be part of its rule of recognition, the Democratic formal and substantive versions of the rule of 
law are incompatible with populism, as they appear to be incompatible with any ideology envisaging 
unlimited sovereignty. Although the populist instrumentalisation of law has been discussed in 
pejorative terms, it can still “be a rule of law success story in formal terms, while systematically 
violating the underlying values of the rule of law”.147 
 
CONCLUSION 
A robust conceptualisation of populism is inseparable from a rigorous examination of its relationship 
with democracy and the rule of law. Democracy and populism are both grounded on popular 
sovereignty and majority rule. Yet, democracy’s pluralism finding expression in a dynamic public 
space clearly opposes it to populism which suggests that the will of the people is fixed and 
indisputable. Similarly, democracy’s commitment to the protection of individual rights is in stark 
contrast to populism’s view of an absolute and unlimited sovereignty. A novel conceptualisation of 
populism, in addition to acknowledging the malleability of this phenomenon, has to take into account 
its possible compatibility with thin versions of the rule of law. Democracy’s adherence to a 
substantive version of the rule of law is certainly a distinguishing factor with populism, though what 
predominantly determines their relationship is the extent of the latter’s challenge to the foundational 
rules of the system.  
The impact of populism on democracy largely depends on and should be measured by 
reference to the severity of its attempt to alter the democratic rule of recognition, reconstruct its 
content and, thus, subvert the social foundations of the democratic constitution. By virtue of this, 
populism seeks to instrumentalise the rule of recognition to make its ‘people’ sovereign.  While a thin 
rule by law can still be part of the populist rule of recognition, it has to be subordinated to the will of 
the people, which is the ultimate criterion of legal validity. The insertion of moral considerations as 
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additional criteria allows populism to sustain and, when in power, implement its narrative that politics 
ought to be the expression of the will of the pure people as opposed to the corrupt elite.  
The populist impact on the democratic rule of recognition provides scholars with a relatively 
stable point of reference for measuring the effect of populism on democracy. By making its 
recommended set of ideas and definition of concepts part of the rule of recognition, which as a social 
rule relies on widespread acceptance, populism has the potential to gradually acquire the status of a 
full ideology. Further empirical study is necessary along these lines, this time having a concrete basis 
to test this contested concept. 
 
